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12.1 Introduction
Many economic models are based on the forward-looking behavior of
economic agents. Although it is often said that “expectations” about fu-
ture events are important in these models, it is the probability distributions
of future events that inﬂuence the models. For example, an individual’s
consumption and saving decisions are believed to depend upon concerns
regarding future interest rates, the likelihood of dying, and the risk of sub-
stantial future medical expenditures. According to our theories, decision
makers have subjective probability distributions about these and other
events in their lives and, moreover, use them to make decisions about their
saving practices.
A typical objective of empirical models on intertemporal decision mak-
ing is to estimate responses to changes in variable levels, such as changes in
saving due to an anticipated change in the interest rate. A second objective
is to ﬁnd the extent of an individual’s risk aversion; namely, what is his or
her response to changes in outcome variability? For instance, do changes
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the authors and not necessarily those of NBER.These are worthwhile objectives due to the importance of choices that de-
pend on uncertain future events in our society. For example, poverty in old
age depends partly on an individual’s consumption choices at a younger
age. Consequently, how is consumption inﬂuenced by mortality risk and
the uncertainty of medical expenditures? Why do some individuals pur-
chase adequate insurance against unfavorable outcomes while others do
not? Why do many reach retirement age with inadequate ﬁnancial provi-
sions for postretirement living expenses? Is it due to misperceptions about
the probabilities of reaching old age? Do people maintain excessive hous-
ing into old age as a hedge against inﬂation risk? The answers to these and
similar questions depend on our understandings of decision maker reac-
tions to future uncertainty. Moreover, creating policies that alleviate the
consequences of such decision-making processes depends on answers to
the aforementioned questions.
In a few economic models, we have data on probability distributions that
are assumed to approximate those required by decision-making models
under uncertainty. Life-cycle models of consumption, in which mortality
risk helps determine savings, have been estimated by assuming that indi-
viduals have subjective probability distributions on mortality risk that are
the same as those found from life tables (Hurd 1989). A precautionary mo-
tive for saving thus depends on the risk of future medical outlays. It there-
fore seems reasonable that the distribution of outlays as estimated from
microdata represents a good approximation of the subjective probability
distributions used by decision makers (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes
1995). More generally, Manski (1993) has proposed using observed out-
come probabilities in panel data as estimations of the subjective probabil-
ity distributions for individuals on the panel, on the grounds that the sam-
pling exercise can itself be taken as a model of the subjective probability
process.
In most applications, however, we do not have adequate data for proba-
bility distributions—thus requiring the use of unveriﬁable assumptions in
estimations. For example, in macroeconomic models expectations are as-
sumed to be rational. Yet the rationality assumption cannot be tested out-
side of the model’s immediate context. In life-cycle models on saving, a
cohort’s average mortality risk may not be well approximated by the 
mortality risk found on life tables since the cohort may not believe that the
mortality experience of older cohorts will be the same as his or her own.
Furthermore, individuals within the same cohort will have diﬀerent sub-
jective evaluations of probability distribution and its inﬂuence on their be-
havior, even if it is systematically incorrect. However, such evaluations are
not generally observable. These individual heterogeneities often become
problematic in parameter estimates. For example, consider a typical indi-
vidual utility function,








where ct is the consumption at time t, and   is the risk aversion parameter.
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where ht is the individual subjective hazard rates, while Xt represents cer-
tain sociodemographic variables. In this framework, if ht is not observed
but correlated with Xt, we will have a typical endogeneity problem. If ht is
poorly measured, estimations of   will subsequently be biased.
Previous studies have typically obtained individual mortality risks
through two diﬀerent approaches: either by using life tables or by using
well-known variations in mortality rates by economic status. Since mor-
tality risk life tables only vary by age, race, and sex, there are not enough
variations from which to calculate mortality risks. If subjective mortality
risks of individuals with diﬀerent economic status vary in the same way as
observed mortality rates, model estimations using standard life tables will
lead to biased estimates. Moreover, forecasts of economic status distribu-
tions will be incorrect such that poorer individuals who believe that their
mortality risk is higher will spend money faster than what is predicted by
the model. Although mortality risk variations can, in principle, be calcu-
lated from some given variables, individuals surely have subjective proba-
bility distributions that are only partly related to observable variables.
Two recent surveys have posed questions regarding individual subjective
probabilities, including Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old
(AHEAD) and the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). Hurd and Mc-
Garry (1995) reveal that average survival probabilities are very close to
those presented in life tables. In a more recent paper, Hurd and McGarry
(2002) use panel data from HRS and ﬁnd that respondents modify their
probabilities in response to new information, such as the onset of a new ill-
ness. Their ﬁndings are consistent with an earlier study of Hamermesh
(1985), who surveys a selected sample of economists about their survival
probabilities. On average, self-reported survival probabilities are consis-
tent with life tables; at the personal level, however, these probabilities face
a serious problem. In all age groups, we ﬁnd that a large fraction of re-
spondents give what we call focal-point responses: 0.0 and 1.0. These re-
sponses cannot represent the respondents’ true probabilities, as the dis-
tribution of true probabilities should be continuous, and moreover, true
probabilities cannot literally equal 0 or 1. Thus, the main focus of this pa-
per is to recover the true subjective survival curve for each respondent. To
do so, we develop a Bayesian update model to accomplish this objective.
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ity distribution at a future point in time (a   t) be a truncated normal be-
tween 0 and 1 (we do not include 0 and 1). The conditional density of the
observed survival probability is assumed to be a censored normal between
0 and 1, allowing for the focal points. In addition, we suggest two ap-
proaches that model the deviations of each individual’s belief from the life
table.
We use the posterior density mean as an individual’s estimated subjec-
tive survival probabilities, and estimate the model using the observed death
record. Our model produces optimistic indices to measure the deviation of
his or her subjective belief from the life table. Consequently, the survival
curves for each individual produced by the optimistic indexes do not en-
counter problems associated with focal points and have considerable vari-
ations. These subjective survival curves are readily applicable to life-cycle
models and other economic models that require individual subjective mor-
tality risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 12.2 intro-
duces the self-reported subjective survival probabilities including their
consistency with the life table and problems associated with individual re-
sponses. Next, section 12.3 introduces a Bayesian method that helps us to
recover underlying subjective survival curves. Section 12.3 also introduces
two approaches that are used to represent individual deviations from life
tables. In section 12.4, we estimate the model and conduct the out-of-
sample prediction. Lastly, we present the paper’s conclusions in section
12.5.
12.2 Individual Subjective Mortality Risk
In the AHEAD sample, each respondent is asked a series of questions
about how likely it is that various presented future events will occur. These
future events include an income that is consistent with changes in inﬂation,
major medical expenses, leaving a bequest, receiving ﬁnancial help from
family members, moving to a nursing home, and surviving for another ten
to fourteen years.1In particular, the survival probability question AHEAD
posed to respondents is as follows:
[Using any] number from 0 to 100 where “0” means that you think there
is absolutely no chance and “100” means that you think the event is ab-
solutely sure to happen . . . What do you think are chances that: You will
live to at least A? (A is an age that is 11–15 years older than the respon-
dent’s current age.)
To examine whether these survival probabilities carry useful informa-
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1. Bassett and Lumsdaine (2001) ﬁnd that all responses contain a common component.tion, we compare the subjective survival probabilities with the life tables.
Table 12.1 lists the average and median survival probabilities from
AHEAD and the 1992 life tables for the target ages used in the AHEAD
survival questions, as calculated by the ﬁrst two waves of AHEAD (e.g.,
eighty-ﬁve years of age for subjects aged seventy to seventy-four, ninety
years of age for subjects aged seventy-ﬁve to seventy-nine, etc.). In general,
younger AHEAD respondents have average subjective probabilities that
closely mirror life table averages, while older respondents have averages
that are substantially higher.2 In general, AHEAD medians are closely re-
lated to those in the life table.
Table 12.2 lists the percentage of those respondents who gave continu-
ous responses, focal responses, and no responses in the two waves. Table
12.2 also lists the transition probabilities of diﬀerent response modes be-
tween the two waves. In wave 1, only 50 percent of respondents gave con-
tinuous responses, with about 25 percent of them providing either 0 or 1 as
their answers. The subjective probabilities for the remainder of the popu-
lation are not available. In wave 2, about 53 percent of respondents who
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Table 12.1 Self-reported and life table survival probabilities
Target age
Male Female
80 85 90 95 100 80 85 90 95 100
Wave 1
Means
AHEAD 0.557 0.510 0.382 0.332 0.302 0.570 0.510 0.386 0.307 0.289
Life table 0.593 0.422 0.252 0.114 0.037 0.716 0.605 0.432 0.232 0.081
Median
AHEAD 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.250 0.100 0.500 0.500 0.450 0.100 0.100
Life table 0.593 0.422 0.252 0.115 0.037 0.723 0.603 0.433 0.232 0.076
N 90 951 631 436 175 575 1,334 978 664 309
Wave 2
Means
AHEAD 0.524 0.279 0.622 0.278 0.574 0.516 0.283 0.692 0.296 0.559
Life table 0.614 0.457 0.284 0.138 0.078 0.736 0.633 0.464 0.260 0.138
Median
AHEAD 0.500 0.200 0.600 0.200 0.600 0.500 0.200 0.600 0.200 0.600
Life table 0.629 0.456 0.285 0.140 0.051 0.746 0.632 0.465 0.261 0.100
N 95 1,044 675 451 223 620 1,436 1,090 807 498
Note: N   number of observations.
2. Several reasons are suggested in Hurd, McFadden and Gan (1998) for this ﬁnding. One
reason is that the AHEAD survey does not include respondents who reside in nursing homes
or other institutional care facilities. Thus, AHEAD represents a healthier population than is
represented by a life table.were alive gave continuous responses, whereas approximately 19 percent of
the population responded either 0 or 1. A continuous respondent in wave
1 is much more likely to give continuous response again in wave 2. If a re-
spondent gave focal response of 1 in wave 1, he or she is much more likely
to give a focal response of 1 than 0 in wave 2. A person who is a nonre-
spondent in wave 1 is more likely to be a nonrespondent again in wave 2.
Finally, a person who gave a focal response of 0 in wave 1 is much more
likely to die than other persons, indicating that responses themselves do
carry information about the actual survival probabilities, as suggested in
Hurd and McGarry (1995, 2002). Thus the prevalence of focal-point re-
sponses indicates that subjective probability measurements in AHEAD
cannot represent the respondents’ true probabilities. Without correcting
for focal responses of 0 or 1, it is impossible to derive a survival curve that
varies over time. In the next section, we develop a Bayesian update model
to correct focal responses.
12.3 Modeling Individual Subjective Survival Curves
Before we present the model, it is necessary to deﬁne the notations that
we use throughout this paper.
• a: age
• t: time at risk
• L0(t): life table survival probability from birth
• S0a(t)   L0(a   t)/L0(a): life table survival probability from age a
•  0(t): life table integrated mortality hazard rate
•  0(t): life table mortality hazard rate
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Table 12.2 Focal responses
Wave 2
Continuous 0 1 Dead n.a. Total
Wave 1
Continuous 2,728 223 327 227 592 4,097
(66.6) (5.4) (8.0) (5.5) (15.5) (49.9)
0 508 329 44 178 265 1,324
(38.4) (24.9) (3.3) (13.4) (20.0) (16.1)
1 306 18 244 35 119 722
(42.4) (2.5) (33.8) (4.9) (16.4) (8.8)
n.a. 403 106 78 372 1,116 2,075
(19.4) (5.1) (3.8) (17.9) (53.8) (25.3)
Total 3,945 676 693 812 2,092 8,218
(48.0) (8.2) (8.4) (9.9) (25.5)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages. n.a.   not available.• T: an age at which L0(T)   0, say T   108
• i: individual
• Sia(t): personal survival probability from age a to target age a   t for
subject i. Since survival probabilities diﬀer for diﬀerent people at the
same age a, we let Sia(t) be a random variable with a density  (sia[t]),
or  (siat)
•  ia(t): personal integrated mortality hazard rate at age a
•  ia(t): personal mortality hazard rate at age a
•  : time at risk in interview survival question
• piat: response to interview survival question. We assume that piatis mea-
sured with an error. The density of piat, conditional on personal sur-
vival probability from age a to age a   t, is given by f(piatSia    sia )
By deﬁnition, an individual i’s survival curve is
(1) sia(t)   exp[   ia(a   t)    ia(a)]   exp   
t
0
 ia(a   r)dr .
It is ﬁrst necessary to specify the plausible families of  ia(a   t) that sat-
isfy this equation. We propose to use the population hazard function  0a(a
  t) as a base, while minimally modifying it to calculate individual  ia(a  
t). Two alternative ways to specify the  ia(a   t) function include
(2)  ia(a   t)    i 0a(a   t).
The parameter  i is an individual “optimism” parameter. In comparison
with the life table, if  i   1, then the person is “pessimistic”; if  i   1, then
the person is “optimistic.” Since this model in equation (2) scales the pop-
ulation hazard, we will refer to it as a “hazard-scaling” model from now on.
The second model speciﬁcation is given as









This model represents an accelerated failure time frame where the indi-
vidual thinks of himself or herself as aging forward from his or her current
age more or less rapidly than the average person. If a large  i corresponds
to slow future aging, that is,  i   1, then the person is “optimistic”; if  ia  
1, then the person is “pessimistic.” Similarly, we refer to the model in equa-
tion (3) as the “age-scaling” model, as it scales ages to represent individual
optimism.
If pia has no response error or focal bias, the models in equations (2) and
(3) are accurately identiﬁed with no free parameters. We can then take
these models as actual survival information and subsequently decide which
model works best. Since a response error or focal bias in pia  is present, the
personal survival curve is not forced through pia  at age a    . To solve this
problem, we use a model of Bayesian update.
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Bayesian model is  (siat). The mean for prior density is exp(–    0at),
where   represents a parameter for measuring the population’s average
subjective optimistic degree. When   1, the mean of prior distribution Siat
corresponds with the life table value. Given Siat siat, the self-reported sur-
vival probability piat has a conditional density of f(piatsiat). The diﬀerence
between the self-reported survival probability piat and the subjective sur-
vival probability Siat is the measurement error.
The primary objective of this paper is to use the observed pia  to update
the prior density  (sia ) and to obtain the posterior density  (sia pia ). Af-
ter we observe pia , the posterior density of siat is given by
 (sia pia )   .
If the loss function is given by L(Sit, S ˆ
it)   E(Sit – S ˆ
it)2, the best esti-
mator for Si  is S ˆ
i    E(Si pia ). We apply S ˆ
i  to the observed death record
to obtain the model’s parameter values. The log-likelihood function is
given by





ln(1   S ˆ
it).
Maximizing the likelihood function in equation (4) requires specifying
the distribution functions. For the population of agents who share the
same age a, their surviving probabilities to age a   t are diﬀerent. The
random variable Siat is used to represent such diﬀerences. Let the prior
distribution for the random variable Siat,  (sia ) be the truncated normal
distribution with the truncation range being 0   sia   1. We also let the
mean of Siat be exp(–   0at), variance  2
2. The prior distribution is given
by
(5)  (sia;  )   ,
where  ia and  2 satisfy the equation
exp(    0at)    iat    2 (0,1, iat,  2).
The right-hand side of equation (6) represents the mean of the truncated
normal in equation (5). The functional form of  (0,1, iat,  2) in equation (6)
is provided in equation (A2) in the appendix. We let the conditional den-
sity of the responses to interview survival questions follow a censored nor-
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pia   
 1
 ia     when 0   pia    1;





     and Pr(pia    1sia )   1     
1  
 1
 ia    .
Furthermore, we assume that the expectation of the conditional distri-
bution is sia. Thus,  ia and  1 satisfy the following equation:
sia      
1  
 1





a      1 [ ia      (e, f,  ia,  1)] 
  1     
1  
 1
 ia    
The formula for the mean of the censored normal is given in equation
(A3) in the appendix. The censored normal captures the idea that many ob-
servations may be at 0 or 1. Given piat, the posterior distribution is given by
(7)  (siapia )   .
The distribution in equation (7) is no longer a normal or a censored nor-
mal. The best estimator for siaunder a mean square loss function is its mean:
(8) S ˆ





When piat   0, we have
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 (siapia    0)   .
Then, the best predictor for Sia when piat   0 is
(9) S ˆ
ia   .
Similarly, when piat   1,
 (siapia    1)   ,
with the best predictor being given by
(10) S ˆ
ia   .
In equations (8), (9), and (10), we obtain the predicted S ˆ
ia given the ob-
served subjective survival probability of pia . In the next section, we discuss
how to estimate our model. We also present the estimation results and out-
of-sample predictions.
12.4 Estimation and Out-of-Sample Prediction
Since respondents are interviewed every two years, we update informa-
tion regarding whether they are still alive, accordingly. The likelihood func-
tion in equation (4) should be changed to: ln L   Σalive ln S ˆ
ia2   Σdead ln(1 –
S ˆ
ia2). However, the self-reported survival probability is not the survival
probability during a two-year period. Rather, it typically represents a sur-
vival probability ten to ﬁfteen years in the future.
To derive a survival probability in two years, it is necessary to get indi-
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386 Li Gan, Michael D. Hurd, and Daniel McFaddenvidual optimistic indexes  i. First, we consider the hazard-scaling model in
equation (2). Plug equation (2) into equation (1), and we get
(11) sia(t)   exp[   i 0a(t)].
In equation (11), by letting t    , we can solve for the individual opti-
mistic index  i:














If we plug equation (12) into equation (11), but let t   2, we can get the
survival probability in a two-year period:
(13) S ˆ
ia2   S ˆ
ia 
  0a2/  0a ,
Therefore, the log-likelihood function in equation (4) should be rewrit-
ten to accommodate the observed data. The new log-likelihood function is
given by




  0a2/  0a   ∑
dead
ln(1   S ˆ
ia 
  0a2/  0a ).
Second, we consider the age-scaling model in equation (3). Although we
cannot arrive at the explicit expression of  i, we can numerically solve the
following equation to obtain the value of  i for each individual:
(15) S ˆ




      0(a)].
Similarly to the hazard-scaling model, the numerically obtained   ˆi is
then used to calculate the survival probability in a two-year period:
(16) S ˆ








   S ˆ
ia .
Plugging equation (16) into equation (14), we have a likelihood function.
Maximizing the likelihood function yields the parameter estimates of the
model.
In sum, we let the prior survival probability distribution from age a to
age a   t be a truncated normal (between 0.0 and 1.0). The conditional
density of observed survival probabilities is assumed to be a censored nor-
mal, allowing for the focal points 0.0 and 1.0. The posterior density of the
survival probabilities has, therefore, a distribution that does not allow for
the focal points 0.0 and 1.0. In order to obtain the model’s parameter val-
ues, we apply the posterior distribution mean to actual death records be-
tween wave 1 and wave 2 in order to estimate a person’s survival proba-
bility.
Both the hazard-scaling model in equation (2) and the age-scaling model
in equation (3) are estimated. In each model, we ﬁrst let   1, constrain-
Individual Subjective Survival Curves 387ing the mean of the prior density to be the same as that of the life table.
Whenever we do this, we refer to the model as the constrained model. In
addition, we let   be an estimated parameter. In this case, we let the data
determine if the prior density mean is the same as the life tables. We refer
to such a model as an unconstrained model. Table 12.3 lists the results of
four diﬀerent speciﬁcations: constrained hazard-scaling model, uncon-
strained hazard-scaling model, constrained age-scaling model, and, ﬁ-
nally, unconstrained age-scaling model. All four speciﬁcations yield rea-
sonable estimates that are highly signiﬁcant. Moreover, likelihood ratio
tests favor unconstrained models over constrained models.
Since we use a survey that currently has three waves of data available, we
can apply the estimated parameters to actual survival experiences in wave
3 observations and compare the log-likelihood of each model for model se-
lection. We select the sample that comprises individuals who are still alive
in wave 2, then calculate the log-likelihood values separated by those who
are alive in wave 3 and those who are dead between waves 2 and 3. The log-
likelihood from the out-of-sample prediction is given by
ln L       ∑
alive in wave 3
ln S ˆ
ia4   ∑
dead b/w waves 2&3
ln(1   S ˆ
ia4).
The log-likelihood values from the out-of-sample predictions are re-
ported in table 12.3. The two unconstrained models perform much better
than the corresponding two constrained models. Between the two uncon-
strained models, the hazard-scaling model yields slightly better likelihood
values than the age-scaling model. Finally, we calculate the maximum like-
lihood value if the life-table survival rates are used. The value is –1,533.4,
388 Li Gan, Michael D. Hurd, and Daniel McFadden
Table 12.3 Estimation results
Hazard-scaling Age-scaling
ψ is a  ψ is a 
ψ   1 parameter ψ   1 parameter
Standard deviation of conditional  .3255 .1837 .5434 .2793
density:  1 (censored normal) (.1197) (.0154) (.0012) (.0312)
Standard deviation of prior density:  .2045 .1165 .3159 0.1083
 2 (truncated normal) (.0045) (.0176) (.0000011) (.0304)
Average optimistic parameter: ψ .7226 0.6590
(.0507) (.0011)
Maximum likelihood valuea –1,495 –1,483 –1,500 –1,491
Log likelihood for out-of-sample  –1,692.9 –1,532.4 –1,644.1 –1,533.4
predictionb
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
aThe likelihood value calculated from life table survival rates is –1,533.4.
bThe likelihood value for out-of-sample prediction using life table survival rates is –2,559.0.much smaller than any of the four speciﬁcations. Further, using the life
table survival rates to predict the observed survival experience yields the
maximum likelihood of –2,599.0. Again, this value is much smaller than
the likelihood values from out-of-sample predictions from any of the four
speciﬁcations in this paper. Clearly, the subjective survival probabilities
can predict the observed survival record much better than the life tables.
For each speciﬁcation, we calculate the optimistic indexes  i for each in-
dividual. The formula to calculate  i in the hazard-scaling model is given
by equation (12), while the implicit formula to calculate  i in the age-
scaling model is provided in equation (15). Table 12.4 presents the sum-
mary statistics of the indexes and the correlation coeﬃcients from the four
diﬀerent models’ indexes.
From table 12.4, we ﬁnd that the correlation coeﬃcients among diﬀerent
indexes are very high. The lowest correlation coeﬃcient between the un-
constrained hazard-scaling model and the age-scaling model is –.8975. The
negative signs for the correlation coeﬃcients between the two models are
expected; that is, in the hazard-scaling model, the larger the index, the less
optimistic a person is. The inverse result can be found for the age-scaling
model: namely, the larger the index, the more optimistic a person is. The
highest correlation coeﬃcient between the unconstrained and the con-
strained hazard-scaling models is .9887, which is very close to 1.
Although the correlations among the four diﬀerent speciﬁcations are
very high, the means of estimated  i from the four diﬀerent models diﬀer
signiﬁcantly. These means are also reported in table 12.4. The estimated   ˆi
for unconstrained speciﬁcations portrays a more optimistic picture than
those for constrained speciﬁcations. In the hazard-scaling model, the aver-
age   ˆi in the constrained speciﬁcation is 1.020, indicating that an individ-
ual’s subjective survival probability on average is very close to the life table.
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Table 12.4 Correlation coeﬃcients among four optimistic indexes
Hazard-scaling Age-scaling
Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained
Hazard-scaling (constrained) 1 .9887 –.9000 –.9019
(.00024) (.0014) (.0018)
Hazard-scaling (unconstrained) 1 –.8975 –.9284
(.0017) (.0016)
Age-scaling (constrained) 1 .9479
(.0015)
Age-scaling (unconstrained) 1
Means 1.040 .822 1.051 1.271
(.375) (.296) (.227) (.186)
Notes:“Constrained” indicates ψ 1; “unconstrained” indicates ψis a parameter to be estimated. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses, calculated from bootstrapping 1,000 times of the sample.In the unconstrained version of the hazard model, the average   ˆiis .822, in-
dicating that people are generally optimistic about their survival probabil-
ities. Similar patterns occur in the two speciﬁcations of the age-scaling
model.
In the constrained speciﬁcation, the means of the prior densities (trun-
cated normal) are constrained according to life-table survival probabilities.
The Bayesian update model only changes its  2, that is, the standard devi-
ation of the original normal density that generates the truncated normal
density (see equations [5] and [6]). Although updating  2 may have some
eﬀects on the means of the prior densities, the eﬀects are relatively small.
Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the constrained versions of both
models are very similar to life tables. In the unconstrained speciﬁcation, in
addition to obtaining the value of  2, the updated Bayesian model also
changes the mean of the prior density through  .
Although diﬀerent speciﬁcations yield diﬀerent levels of optimistic in-
dexes, an important feature of all these indexes is that a signiﬁcant hetero-
geneity exists among all individuals. The individual heterogeneity in  i can
be summarized by a simple regression that uses the optimism indexes to
regress certain demographic variables. In this regression, four diﬀerent op-
timism indexes represent dependent variables, while independent variables
include a constant, the person’s age, a male dummy, an African American
dummy, a Hispanic dummy, a marriage status dummy, a high school grad-
uate dummy, a some-college dummy, a college (including postcollege)
dummy, mother’s age at the time of death, father’s age at the time of death,
and lastly, the wealth level at wave 1 in $1,000. The last column in table 12.5
lists the summary statistics of the variables we used in the regression. The
ﬁrst four columns in table 12.5 report the estimation results.
From the estimates reported in table 12.5, the coeﬃcients for African
American dummies are negative for the hazard-scaling model speciﬁca-
tions and positive for the age-scaling model speciﬁcations. All coeﬃcients
indicate that African Americans are more optimistic than white respon-
dents. No diﬀerence exists between Hispanic and White respondents in
terms of their optimism indexes. Neither does a person’s marriage status
make any diﬀerence in his or her optimism indexes. Another pattern that
can be found in all four speciﬁcations is that male respondents are more
optimistic than female respondents. In addition, older respondents are
generally more optimistic than younger respondents in three speciﬁca-
tions. The only exception is the unconstrained age-scaling model, where
the age coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant. Parents’ ages of death also aﬀect
people’s subjective optimistic indexes: people whose parents died at older
ages are more optimistic than people whose parents died at younger ages.
Finally, as expected, richer people are more optimistic than poorer people.
Tables 12.6 through 12.9 provide the predicted survival probabilities of
four diﬀerent speciﬁcations, the stated survival probabilities, and the life
390 Li Gan, Michael D. Hurd, and Daniel McFaddentable survival probabilities. The predicted survival probabilities in the un-
constrained speciﬁcations are higher than those based on constrained
speciﬁcations. This derives from the fact that the unconstrained speciﬁca-
tions produce indexes that indicate more optimism than those based on
constrained speciﬁcations.
In ﬁgure 12.1, we produce two ﬁtted probability histograms for males
and females between the ages of seventy and seventy-four at the time the
survey is conducted for the constrained hazard-scaling model. The his-
tograms for all other age groups and all other models are the same save for
their location. From this ﬁgure, all focal responses of 0 and 1 have moved
away from 0 and 1. For example, for males who are between seventy and
seventy-four years old at the time of the survey, the predicted probabilities
of surviving to age eighty-ﬁve are .22 and .61 if the responses are 0 and 1,
respectively. Figure 12.2 has various survival curves for both males and fe-
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Table 12.5 Summary regressions of four optimistic indices
Hazard-scaling Age-scaling
Summary 
Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained statistics
Constant 2.193 1.738 .638 .809
(.071) (.056) (.044) (.035)
Age –.0116 –.0093 .0037 .0045 75.46
(.00081) (.00064) (.0005) (.0004) (6.09)
Male –.173 –.130 .100 .088 .371
(.010) (.0079) (.0062) (.0051) (.483)
Black –.085 –.068 .066 .052 .107
(.015) (.012) (.0094) (.0076) (.309)
Hispanic .039 .024 .0078 .0038 .045
(.022) (.018) (.014) (.011) (.207)
Married .0153 .014 –.012 –.00074 .579
(.010) (.0082) (.0064) (.0052) (.494)
High school  –.031 –.021 .0037 .0066 .323
graduate (.011) (.0089) (.0070) (.0057) (.468)
Some college –.059 –.043 .0172 .0168 .166
(.014) (.011) (.0085) (.0069) (.372)
College –.070 –.051 .0157 .0186 .136
graduate (.015) (.012) (.0093) (.0075) (.343)
Mom’s age  –.0012 –.00096 6.13E-04 5.08E-04 72.08
of death (.00031) (.00024) (1.90E-04) (1.53E-04) (14.83)
Dad’s age  –.00124 –.00098 5.80E-04 4.48E-04 74.04
of death (.00029) (.00024) (1.76E-04) (1.42E-04) (15.97)
Wealth/1,000 in  –4.34E-05 –3.64E-05 1.03E-05 1.51E-05 192.3
wave 1 (1.24E-05) (9.82E-06) (7.69E-06) (6.21E-06) (383.0)
No. of  6,092 6,092 6,092 6,092 6,092
observations
R2 .109 .104 .069 .092




Age Target  Life  pia    0  pia    1 
group age table Predicted Stated (predicted) (predicted) Predicted Stated
Female
70–74 85 0.5880 0.5565 0.5001 0.3571 0.7592 0.5604 0.5095
(0.0696) (0.0218) (0.0213) (0.1215)
75–79 90 0.4250 0.4426 0.4616 0.2486 0.6584 0.4107 0.3885
(0.0745) (0.0155) (0.0348) (0.1319)
80–84 95 0.2240 0.2904 0.4139 0.1398 0.4806 0.2485 0.3029
(0.0666) (0.0176) (0.0213) (0.1113)
Male
70–74 85 0.3970 0.4293 0.4845 0.2270 0.6342 0.4383 0.5103
(0.0680) (0.0225) (0.0250) (0.1199)
75–79 90 0.2500 0.3086 0.4127 0.1466 0.5091 0.2936 0.3820
(0.0651) (0.0133) (0.0446) (0.1079)
80–84 95 0.1130 0.1848 0.3960 0.0771 0.3208 0.1645 0.3324
(0.0543) (0.0119) (0.0561) (0.0845)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.




Age Target  Life  pia    0  pia    1 
group age table Predicted Stated (predicted) (predicted) Predicted Stated
Female
70–74 85 0.5880 0.6266 0.5001 0.4659 0.8062 0.6322 0.5095
(0.0708) (0.0193) (0.0207) (0.1084)
75–79 90 0.4250 0.5171 0.4616 0.3602 0.7069 0.4927 0.3885
(0.0769) (0.0169) (0.0323) (0.1162)
80–84 95 0.2240 0.3634 0.4139 0.2117 0.5551 0.3213 0.3029
(0.0790) (0.0242) (0.0158) (0.1167)
Male
70–74 85 0.3970 0.5042 0.4845 0.3339 0.6838 0.5129 0.5103
(0.0710) (0.0304) (0.0227) (0.1092)
75–79 90 0.2500 0.3814 0.4127 0.2224 0.5777 0.3667 0.3820
(0.0750) (0.0199) (0.0377) (0.1109)
80–84 95 0.1130 0.2673 0.3960 0.1191 0.4503 0.2390 0.3324
(0.0771) (0.0171) (0.0380) (0.1146)




Age Target  Life  pia    0  pia    1 
group age table Predicted Stated (predicted) (predicted) Predicted Stated
Female
70–74 85 0.5880 0.5561 0.5001 0.5589 0.7554 0.5589 0.5095
(0.0565) (0.1167) (0.0195) (0.1167)
75–79 90 0.4250 0.4452 0.4616 0.2516 0.6629 0.4136 0.3885
(0.0611) (0.0141) (0.0342) (0.1276)
80–84 95 0.2240 0.2917 0.4139 0.1505 0.4750 0.2529 0.3029
(0.0524) (0.0165) (0.0249) (0.1024)
Male
70–74 85 0.3970 0.4306 0.4845 0.2320 0.6399 0.4407 0.5103
(0.0552) (0.0209) (0.0250) (0.1154)
75–79 90 0.2500 0.3112 0.4127 0.1572 0.5070 0.2974 0.3820
(0.0524) (0.0132) (0.0476) (0.0998)
80–84 95 0.1130 0.1788 0.3960 0.0850 0.2879 0.1602 0.3324
(0.0431) (0.0123) (0.0646) (0.0717)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.





Age Target  Life  pia    0  pia    1 
group age table Predicted Stated (predicted) (predicted) Predicted Stated
Female
70–74 85 0.5880 0.6689 0.5001 0.5850 0.7728 0.6733 0.5095
(0.0384) (0.0202) (0.0241) (0.0606)
75–79 90 0.4250 0.5531 0.4616 0.4720 0.6592 0.5413 0.3885
(0.0446) (0.0184) (0.0369) (0.0649)
80–84 95 0.2240 0.3825 0.4139 0.3007 0.4864 0.3598 0.3029
(0.0457) (0.0286) (0.0179) (0.0662)
Male
70–74 85 0.3970 0.5342 0.4845 0.4427 0.6329 0.5392 0.5103
(0.0394) (0.0351) (0.0258) (0.0613)
75–79 90 0.2500 0.4043 0.4127 0.2812 0.5122 0.3956 0.3820
(0.0458) (0.0684) (0.0429) (0.0657)
80–84 95 0.1130 0.2715 0.3960 0.1738 0.3719 0.2509 0.3324
(0.0488) (0.0239) (0.0417) (0.0728)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.males at age seventy for both constrained and unconstrained speciﬁcations
in the hazard-scaling model. Graphs based on other models at other age
categories look similar. In ﬁgure 12.2, the lines “personal-p 1” and “per-
sonal-p   0” represent the survival curves if the response is 1 and 0, re-
spectively. The line “personal-p Average” represents the survival curve if
the response represents the average of all responses. Not surprisingly, a
person whose response is 1 typically has the highest survival curve, thus
demonstrating the highest survival probabilities, while a person whose re-
sponse is 0 has the lowest survival curve.
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Fig. 12.1 Histograms of predicted survival probabilities: A, predicted survival
probabilities to age 85 among 70–74 year males (constrained hazard-scaling model);
B, predicted survival probabilities to age 85 among 70–74 year females (constrained
hazard-scaling model)
A
BThe densities of prior and posterior distributions are illustrated in ﬁg-
ure 12.3. The ﬁrst panel in ﬁgure 12.3 shows the prior and posterior den-
sities if the response is 1, with the posterior density lying to the right of
the prior density. Similarly, in the second panel in ﬁgure 12.3, the poste-
rior density lies to the left of the prior density if the response is 0. This is
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A
Fig. 12.2 Survival curves: A, survival curves for males aged 70 (unconstrained haz-
ard-scaling model); B, survival curves for females aged 70 (unconstrained hazard-
scaling model); C, survival curves for males aged 70 (constrained hazard-scaling
model); D, survival curves for females aged 70 (constrained hazard-scaling model)
BC
Fig. 12.2 (cont.) Survival curves: A, survival curves for males aged 70 (uncon-
strained hazard-scaling model); B, survival curves for females aged 70 (uncon-
strained hazard-scaling model); C, survival curves for males aged 70 (constrained
hazard-scaling model); D, survival curves for females aged 70 (constrained hazard-
scaling model)
Dwhat one would expect from the Bayesian update model. The third panel
in ﬁgure 12.3 illustrates a case where the response is 0.5. In this case, it is
unclear a priori that the response would pull the prior to the left or the
right.
Finally, we produce histograms of the estimated optimistic parameters  i
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A
Fig. 12.3 Densities of prior, conditional, and posterior distributions: A, prior and
posterior densities for males aged 70 with P   1: survival rate   0.5654; B, prior
and posterior distributions for males aged 70 with P   0: survival rate   0.5654; C,
prior and posterior densities for males aged 70 with P   0.5: survival rate   0.5654
Bfor all four models in ﬁgure 12.4. The average and standard deviations of  i
are also given in the histograms. There are signiﬁcant variations between
these indexes. The signiﬁcant variations in optimistic indexes produce sig-
niﬁcant variations in individual survival curves.
12.5 Conclusions
Many economic models are based on forward-looking behavior on the
part of economic agents. Surveys such as HRS and AHEAD ask individu-
als for their expectations on the probability of given future events’ occur-
ring in their lifetime. On average, the subjective probability of a future
event is consistent with the observed probability that the event does occur.
For example, average individual survival probabilities are consistent with
those from the life tables.
However, at the micro level, the subjective probability responses in HRS
and AHEAD suﬀer serious problems of focal responses of 0.0 and 1.0.
Consequently, applications of subjective probabilities will be extremely
limited if “true” subjective survival probabilities are not recovered.
In this paper, we suggest a Bayesian update model to account for prob-
lems caused by focal responses of 0.0 and 1.0. As a result, individual sur-
398 Li Gan, Michael D. Hurd, and Daniel McFadden
C
Fig. 12.3 (cont.) Densities of prior, conditional, and posterior distributions: A,
prior and posterior densities for males aged 70 with P   1: survival rate   0.5654;
B, prior and posterior distributions for males aged 70 with P   0: survival rate  
0.5654; C, prior and posterior densities for males aged 70 with P   0.5: survival rate
  0.5654vival curves derived from the model do not suﬀer the problems of focal re-
sponses. We also propose two approaches to model the individual hetero-
geneities of their subjective survival curves. One approach modiﬁes the life
table hazard rates, while another approach models the subjective aging
process, which is diﬀerent from the life table aging process. The model is es-
timated from the observed survival information of our sample. From the
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A
Fig. 12.4 Histogram for optimistic indices: A, histogram for optimistic index: un-
constrained hazard-scaling model (mean   0.8229, standard deviation   0.2956);
B, histogram for optimistic index: constrained hazard-scaling model (mean  
1.0398, standard deviation   0.3752); C, histogram for optimistic index: uncon-
strained age-scaling model (mean   1.2708, standard error   0.1855); D, histogram
for optimistic index: constrained age-scaling model (mean   1.0617, standard devi-
ation   .2049)
Bestimated model, we construct several optimistic indexes for each individ-
ual and conduct a test that is based on out-of-sample prediction. These op-
timistic indexes are used to create individual subjective survival curves that
have considerable variations and are readily applicable to economic mod-
els that require individual subjective survival curves. In a companion pa-
per,  we apply these individual subjective survival curves to a life-cycle
model of savings and bequests.
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Fig. 12.4 (cont.) Histogram for optimistic indices: A, histogram for optimistic in-
dex: unconstrained hazard-scaling model (mean   0.8229, standard deviation  
0.2956); B, histogram for optimistic index: constrained hazard-scaling model (mean
  1.0398, standard deviation   0.3752); C, histogram for optimistic index: uncon-
strained age-scaling model (mean   1.2708, standard error   0.1855); D, histogram
for optimistic index: constrained age-scaling model (mean   1.0617, standard devi-
ation   .2049)
DAppendix
Mean of the Truncated Normal Distribution
If x ~ N[ ,  2], the density of the truncated normal distribution is then
g(xe   x   f )   .
The mean is
(A1) E[xe x f ]   
f
exg(xe x f )dx 
    
       (e, f,  ,  ),
where
(A2)  (e, f,  ,  )   .
Mean of the Censored Normal Distribution
If x∗ ~ N[ ,  2] and x   e if x∗   e; x   x∗ if e   x∗   f; and x   f if 
x∗   f, where e and f are constant, then
(A3) E[x]  Pr(x e)Exx e Pr(e x f )Exe x f Pr[x f ]Exx f
 Pr(x∗ e)e Pr(e x∗ f )E[x∗e x∗ f ]  Pr[x∗ f ]f
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where  (e, f,  ,  ) is deﬁned in equation (A2).
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Comment Robert J. Willis
Cognitive capacity, personality, physical abilities, motivation, and other
factors inﬂuence the willingness of individuals to participate in surveys,
their willingness to answer any given question, and the quality of the infor-
mation they provide in their answers to that question. Survey designers at-
tempt to minimize survey and item nonresponse and try to ask questions in
a way that will elicit “true” answers. While much progress has been made in
increasing the quality of data produced by surveys such as the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS) used in the Gan, Hurd, and McFadden (GHM)
paper, there remains considerable heterogeneity in the quality of responses
across respondents. Because of this, I believe that economists (and other
survey users) need to develop theories of survey response that provide a link
between observed responses and the underlying true values. It is also im-
portant to recognize that many of the factors that inﬂuence the quality of an
individual’s survey responses may also inﬂuence his or her behavior in the
real world. This suggests that it may be useful to model behavior in the real
world and on surveys jointly. The paper by GHM under discussion can be
understood as an important contribution to this general agenda.
The HRS has pioneered asking questions about subjective probability
beliefs on a wide variety of topics, including survival probabilities. These
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Robert J. Willis is a professor of economics at the University of Michigan.questions depart from the conventional approach to expectations in eco-
nomics. Speciﬁcally, as Dominitz and Manski (1999) argue, “Economists
have typically assumed that expectations formation is homogeneous; all
persons condition their beliefs on the same variables and process their in-
formation in the same way” (Dominitz and Manski 1999, p. 16). Within
the conventional approach, probability beliefs are treated as unobservable,
and assumptions about beliefs, such as rational expectations, along with
assumptions about unobservable preference parameters, such as risk aver-
sion or time preference, are embedded in optimizing models from which
(hopefully) testable relations between observable variables may be derived.
An important motivation for asking directly about subjective probabilities
in a survey is to allow relaxation of the assumption of homogeneous ex-
pectations by converting probabilities from an unobservable to an observ-
able quantity that may vary across respondents and thus capture individ-
ual heterogeneity in expectations.
Early analysis of the survival probabilities questions in HRS by Hurd
and McGarry (1995) showed that, on average, there was (to me, surprising)
agreement between these subjective reports and life table estimates of sur-
vival, including covariation with health status and health behaviors such
assmoking. However, the probability reports are quite “noisy,” with a large
number of “focal” answers at 0 percent, 100 percent, and 50 percent. In
terms of the original purpose of asking these probability questions, this is
quite troublesome. On the one hand, there is clear evidence that the survey
questions are successful in capturing important information about
people’s probability beliefs. On the other hand, it is also clear that answers
at the individual level do not necessarily measure a given person’s proba-
bility beliefs.
GHM attempt to clarify the link between survey responses and an indi-
vidual’s subjective survival probability by utilizing three pieces of infor-
mation: (a) the individual’s survey response to a question about the prob-
ability of survival to a given age, (b) the life table estimate of the survival
probability of a person whose demographic characteristics (age, race, sex)
match those of the respondent, and (c) observations of the subsequent
mortality experience of members of the AHEAD cohort in the HRS. These
three pieces of information are combined in an elegant Bayesian model in
order to recalibrate the range of individual answers to conform to a range
consistent with the life table, and to estimate an individual-speciﬁc “opti-
mism” parameter indicating the degree to which a given person believes
that he or she is more or less likely to survive than observationally identical
individuals.1 If this approach is successful, the recalibrated probabilities
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1. The survival probability questions ask about survival to a given age, which varies with
the current age of the respondent. GHM rescale these probabilities to measure one minus the
annual mortality hazard.can be used as direct measures of individual subjective survival prob-
abilities in optimizing models that allow for individual-speciﬁc hetereo-
geneity in beliefs.
In my comments, I ﬁrst use a geometric approach to explain how the
GHM model works. I then argue that GHM fail to take into account the
uncertainty (or ambiguity or imprecision) that an individual may have
about his or her mortality risks and that this may lead to a bias in the esti-
mated probabilities implied by their model. Using a theory of survey re-
sponse to probability questions developed in Lillard and Willis (2001), I
sketch out why the GHM model should be generalized to include the de-
gree of uncertainty about probability beliefs and discuss brieﬂy why het-
erogeneity in the precision of probability beliefs as well as heterogeneity in
optimism may be important for behavior.
One basic problem in relating survey responses on subjective survival
probabilities to an objective measure of survival probabilities is illustrated
in ﬁgure 12C.1. The lower panel of ﬁgure 12C.1 shows a histogram of sub-
jective survival probabilities based on responses in wave 1 of AHEAD. The
histogram shows that responses cover the entire range from 0 to 100 per-
cent. The histogram shows heaping at focal points of 0 and 100, which
GHM regard as improper responses, because it is not possible for proba-
bilities to be truly 0 or 1. There is also a focal response at 50, which pro-
duces a larger spike than those at 0 or 100. The focal response at 50 is ig-
nored by GHM, a point to which I return later.
The upper panel of ﬁgure 12C.1 depicts a stylized “calibration curve”
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Fig. 12C.1 Calibration of survival probabilities: Histogram of responses to sur-
vival probability question, AHEAD 1993(Camerer 1995), which relates subjective probability reports, measured on
the horizontal axis, to relative frequencies such as life table estimates, mea-
sured on the vertical axis. If the elicitation of subjective survival probabil-
ities on the survey is completely successful and if respondents have rational
expectations, the calibration curve would correspond to a 45-degree line.
For example, consider a set of sixty-ﬁve-year-old respondents who give the
answer 80 percent when asked about their chance of survival to age sev-
enty-ﬁve. These respondents would be judged as “well calibrated” if 80 per-
cent of them actually survived after ten years.
In practice, calibration curves usually tend to be ﬂatter than the 45-
degree line, like the thick line labeled E(survivePr(survive)) in ﬁgure
12C.1. In the behavioral economics and psychological literature surveyed
by Camerer (1997), this pattern is usually explained by suggesting a cogni-
tive bias. Thus, Camerer (p. 591) states, “In general subjects are overconﬁ-
dent. They are insuﬃciently regressive in judging the likelihood of events.
Events they say are certain happen only 80 percent of the time.” Con-
versely, “Events judged to be impossible happen 20 percent of the time.” To
an economist reared on Milton Friedman’s explanation for a ﬂat con-
sumption function, an obvious alternative explanation for a ﬂat calibration
curve is that the survey measure of subjective probability contains mea-
surement error, implying that mean response errors tend to be negative for
persons who report relatively low probabilities and positive for people who
report high probabilities.2 Still another possible explanation is that people
vary in their degree of optimism or pessimism about their survival chances.
On average, the pessimists will be found among the people giving low sur-
vival probabilities and the optimists among those with high probabilities.
To the extent that optimism or pessimism is unwarranted, this would also
produce a ﬂat calibration curve.3
These three alternative reasons for a ﬂat calibration curve represent sub-
stantively diﬀerent hypotheses about the nature of subjective probability
beliefs. The ﬁrst suggests that people tend to have biased beliefs, with the
bias becoming worse and worse as the objective probability of the event
tends toward small or large values. The second is consistent with individu-
als having rational expectations that are not elicited with complete accu-
racy on a survey. It is also consistent, as I argue later, with the possibility
that people are uncertain about what the true probability really is. The
third reason emphasizes the possibility of considerable individual hetero-
geneity in beliefs that may or may not be warranted by their private infor-
mation. Obviously, these possibilities are not mutually exclusive. However,
it is of interest to know the extent to which each is operative, since they may
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2. This possibility has also occurred to psychologists. See Soll (1996).
3. Physicians, including Alan Garber at this meeting, tend to think that optimism is a good
trait because they ﬁnd that among patients who present equivalent clinical data the optimists
are more likely to recover than the pessimists.have diﬀerent implications for the way in which people behave in the real
world.
GHM emphasize the role of focal responses at 0 and 100 in creating a
miscalibration of individual responses. They suggest modeling the rela-
tionship between the individual’s subjective survival probability and his
survey response as a truncated normal distribution, with truncation points
at 0 and 1. Two versions of this model are considered. The “constrained
version” assumes that the mean survival probability across respondents is
the same as the life table value, while the “unconstrained” version allows
for the average of the survey responses to diﬀer from the life table esti-
mates.
A geometric interpretation of how their model works is presented in ﬁg-
ure 12C.2, which replicates ﬁgure 12C.1 except for labels and scale. The
vertical axis in ﬁgure 12C.2 measures survival probabilities by the actual
mortality experience of a sample of AHEAD respondents (treated in the
diagram as observationally identical) between wave 1 and wave 2, while the
horizontal axis represents a recalibrated (or rescaled) version of the sub-
jective probabilities such that the expected fraction of survivors in wave 2,
conditional on the rescaled subjective probabilities, falls on the 45-degree
line. The mean of the rescaled probabilities may either be constrained to be
equal to the life table value or be unconstrained and left to be estimated
from the response data. After rescaling, the histogram of survey responses
is compressed, as shown in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 12C.2, so that per-
sons who answer 0 have a substantial positive probability of survival and
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Fig. 12C.2 Recalibration of survival probabilitiesthose who answer 100 have a signiﬁcantly positive probability of death.
(This histogram is conceptually equivalent to those shown in ﬁgure 12.1 of
the GHM paper.)
In addition to allowing the population as a whole to be optimistic or
pessimistic relative to life table probabilities, GHM also allow for an indi-
vidual-speciﬁc optimism parameter. This is depicted in ﬁgure 12C.3 for
persons who give survey responses that are above or below the average of
the answers given by observationally identical members of the AHEAD
sample.
In their empirical work, GHM ﬁnd evidence that, on average, the
AHEAD respondents believe that their survival probabilities are higher
than life table estimates and, in addition, that there is considerable indi-
vidual-speciﬁc variation in their degree of optimism or pessimism, based
on answers to survival probability questions in wave 1 of AHEAD and ob-
served mortality between wave 1 and wave 2. Using the estimated parame-
ters to make out-of-sample predictions using data on the mortality experi-
ence between wave 2 and wave 3 of individuals who survived to wave 2, they
ﬁnd that the unconstrained model is a statistically signiﬁcant improvement
on a model constrained to conform to the life table and that the individual-
speciﬁc parameters are signiﬁcant predictors.
These ﬁndings suggest to me that it might be better to choose some other
term than “optimism” or “pessimism” to describe these parameters. Ap-
parently, individual beliefs contain considerable predictive information
that is not contained in the life table. However, as illustrated in table 12.5
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Fig. 12C.3 Optimism and pessimismof GHM, a signiﬁcant amount of the heterogeneity in individual beliefs is
associated with economic and demographic characteristics of the individ-
ual in the same direction that these characteristics are correlated with ac-
tual health and mortality. It would be useful to have some additional dis-
cussion and, if possible, analysis of the degree to which heterogeneity in
subjective beliefs about survival is rational versus the extent to which it is
biased in an optimistic or pessimistic direction. It would also be interesting
to ask whether the data available in the HRS could be used to address the
physicians’ hypothesis, noted earlier in note 3, that optimism has a beneﬁ-
cial causal eﬀect on survival.
Although their earlier paper on subjective survival curves (Gan, Hurd,
and McFadden 1998) gave equal attention to focal answers at 0, 50, and
100, the current paper ignores focal answers at 50, even though these are
more numerous than those at the endpoints of the distribution. In the con-
cluding part of my comments, I brieﬂy describe a theory of survey response
to probability questions developed in Lillard and Willis (2001) that at-
tempts to relate the pattern of focal and “exact” responses to an individ-
ual’s subjective probability beliefs and discuss some possible implications
of this theory for the GHM model.
In each wave of the HRS survey, respondents are asked a series of sub-
jective probability questions about the likelihood of a variety of events.
Topics range from questions about general events (e.g., likelihood that
economy will experience major depression, of an increase in stock prices,
that tomorrow will be a sunny day), events with private knowledge (e.g.,
survival to a given age), and events subject to personal control (e.g., leav-
ing an inheritance, working past age sixty-two). On average, respondents
take about ﬁfteen seconds to listen to each probability question and give a
response by choosing a number on a scale ranging from 0 to 100.
What is the relationship between the chosen survey response and the re-
spondent’s subjective probability belief about the event in question? Lillard
and Willis (2001) hypothesize that an individual’s subjective belief about
the likelihood of a given event is represented by a subjective density func-
tion, g(p). If the individual has precise beliefs, this density has a mass point
at a particular value of p. For example, the person may believe that the
probability that a coin will come up heads is exactly one-half or the prob-
ability that a die will come up 5 is exactly one-sixth. For many events, in-
cluding the chance of survival, it is reasonable to assume that a respondent
is not completely sure about the value of the probability. This uncertainty
or imprecision is represented by the spread of g( p).
In giving a single number in response to a probability question in HRS,
what aspect of g(p) does the respondent report? One possibility is the
mean: p      1
0 g(p)dp. In addition to being cognitively diﬃcult, assuming
that an answer to a subjective probability question measures p  is inconsis-
tent with the evidence that a large fraction of answers are focal, since p  
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ual might be. An alternative suggested by Lillard and Willis (2001) is the
“modal choice hypothesis.” According to this hypothesis, the respondent
answers by giving that probability, denoted by pmode, which is most likely
among all possible values. This, of course, is the mode of g(p). If the per-
son has relatively precise beliefs, g( p) is unimodal, the value of pmode tends
to be close to p  , and we expect the respondent to give an “exact” (i.e., non-
focal) answer. As the person’s degree of uncertainty increases, we show that
that g( p) tends to become J-shaped with a mode at 0 if p    1/2 or at 1 if p  
  1/2. In these cases, the modal choice hypothesis implies that the individ-
ual will give a focal answer at 0 or 100. As uncertainty increases still fur-
ther, g( p) tends to become bimodal at 0 and 1. In this case, the individual
is truly ambivalent about the most likely value of the probability and gives
a focal answer of 50, reﬂecting his or her “epistemic uncertainty” (Bruine
de Bruin et al. 2000).
One implication of the modal choice hypothesis that is of relevance to
the GHM paper concerns the proper treatment of focal answers versus
nonfocal or exact answers. As is illustrated in ﬁgure 12C.2, the recalibra-
tion of the subjective probabilities in the GHM model compresses the
range of the subjective probabilities, moving the focal answers at 0 and 1
away from these extremes. Their model also compresses the range of the
nonfocal answers so as to maintain the same ordering in the recalibrated
probability as in the raw survey answer. Thus, a person who gives a 99 per-
cent chance of survival to the survey question will be assigned a smaller
probability of survival by GHM than the person who gives a focal answer
of 100 percent. Conversely, a person who gives a very low nonfocal answer
will have that answer raised in order to assign a suﬃciently positive proba-
bility to those who give a focal answer of 0 percent. This is problematic if
people who give focal answers are less certain about their beliefs than those
who give nonfocal answers.
I examine this issue empirically in a simple regression model relating
survival between the ﬁrst two waves of AHEAD to answers to the subjec-
tive survival probability question in wave 1 of AHEAD.4The (unweighted)
fraction of survivors between waves was 0.917. The implied average sub-
jective survival probability including both focal and nonfocal answers is
0.692, considerably below the actual survival rate.5 The average excluding
those who gave focal answers is 0.894, which is much closer to the actual
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4. I thank Jody Schimmel for carrying out this analysis.
5. The raw answer to the survival probability question is ﬁrst rescaled into an annual rate,
using the time distance between the individual’s age and the target age in the question under
the simple but somewhat inaccurate assumption of a constant mortality hazard. (GHM are
more sophisticated in their adjustment for time distance.) This rate is then used to form the
subjective probability of survival from the date of interview at wave 1 to the date of interview
at wave 2. This procedure assigns a probability of 0 or 1 to those who give focal answers at 0
or 100. This rescaled variable is used on the right-hand side of the regressions in table 12C.1.rate. Table 12C.1 reports two regression models. Model 1 simply regresses
actual survival on the (rescaled) subjective survival probability. The slope
coeﬃcient is only 0.105, indicating that the empirical counterpart of the
calibration curve in ﬁgure 12C.1 is extremely ﬂat. Model 2 adds dummy in-
dicators for focal answers at 0, 50, and 100. This causes the slope coeﬃcient
to increase dramatically from 0.105 to 0.264, which, however, is still far
ﬂatter than the 45-degree line in ﬁgure 12C.1. The dummy variables for fo-
cal answers at 0 and 100 are both highly signiﬁcant, while the dummy for
focal at 50 is insigniﬁcant. Model 2 implies that a person who gives a focal
answer of 0 has an actual survival probability that is 13 percentage points
higher than a person who gives very low nonfocal answer. Similarly, a per-
son who gives a focal answer of 100 has a survival chance that is 3.8 per-
centage points lower than a person who gives a nonfocal answer near 100.
These results suggest that hetereogeneity across respondents in the pre-
cision of their subjective beliefs is important and should be taken into
account in recalibrating raw answers to subjective survival probability
questions into values that can be treated as a direct measure of individual-
speciﬁc subjective mortality risk in behavioral models. In addition, Lillard
and Willis (2001) argue that imprecision of beliefs is of direct signiﬁcance
for behavior. For example, they show that imprecision of subjective beliefs
about rates of return to stocks causes individuals to behave more risk
aversely. I would encourage GHM to extend their elegant model of survival
probabilities to address this issue.
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